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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY STEWART EGAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
NANCY LEE EGAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14522 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Gary Egan filed an independent action against his former 
wife Nancy Lee Egan seeking, based upon her allegedly fraudulent 
misrepresentation as to his paternity of a child, to have their 
divorce decree set aside, remand to the Family Court Division 
of the District Court for new trial on all issues, and specified 
general damages and $10,000 punitive damage^. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial to the Court the Hon. Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr. entered Judgment granting partial relielf to respondent by 
reducing his future support obligation by $125.00 per month (the 
amount awarded by the divorce decree for th|e support of the child 
whose paternity was in issue) and deleting all references to the 
child from the divorce decree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment to the extent 
that it grants respondent any relief from the parties Decree of 
Divorce and deletes therefrom all references to Melinda Sarah 
Egan, affirmance of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law to the effect that respondent had competant and 
adequate legal advice in connection with the divorce proceedings, 
that appellant did not destroy any evidence in the divorce action, 
did not act unreasonably or recklessly in making representations 
to respondent, did not commit fraud upon respondent or the divorce 
trial court; appellant further seeks remand to the district court 
with instruction to dismiss respondent's Complaint, with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1974 the parties to this action entered 
into a Stipulation (R.16-23) in connection with a divorce complaint 
theretofore filed by appellant against respondent. Therein respon-
dent Gary Egan agreed that appellant Nancy Egan was pregnant with 
potential issue of their marriage and that he would pay §125.00 
per month as support for the child to be born, as well as $125.00 
per moath support for the parties then eight year old child, a 
total of $250.00 support (R.17). He further agreed that Nancy 
should be awarded use of the parties residence, one-half the cash 
value of a life insurance policy (approximately $600) , and that 
he would pay hospital and doctor bills in connection with the 
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expected birtii (R.21). In addition to agreeing to pay $420,00 
per month alimony (Mrs. Egan being required to discharge the 
mortgage payments on the residence), additional agreements were 
made which are not unusual in divorce actions, including Mr, Egan's 
waiving his right to file an Answer and consenting that his default 
be entered and the divorce action heard witnout further notice 
to him (R.16-17). 
During the period of time that th^ divorce action was 
pending Mr. Egan was represented by competent and adequate legal 
counsel and relied on the advice of his couifsel (Finding of Fact 
No. 6 at R.134). 
Pursuant to the Stipulation a hearing was had on Septem-
ber 16, 1974 as a default matter and a Decree of Divorce (R.6-12) 
was entered based upon a Finding of Fact (No.7 at R.14) that the 
Stipulation hereinbefore referred to was fair and equitable and 
should be approved by the court. The decrep, which provided that 
it was to become final upon signing and entry (which occurred 
on September 20, 1974 (R.6)), provided that appellant was awarded 
custody "of the minor child to be born as issue of this marriage1* 
(R.6, emphasis added), which provision was based upon a Finding 
of Fact (No.8 at R.14) as follows (emphasis added): "The plaintiff 
is expecting the birth of another child, as issue of this mar-
riage. . . .,f 
On March 27, 19 75 appellant gave birth to a female child, 
Melinda Sarah Egan. On June 30, 19 75 Mr. Egan filed the instant 
action independant from the divorce proceedings (R.l) in which 
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he alleged, inter alia, that the divorce court's Judgment, Order 
and Decree of Divorce and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were made and entered pursuant to and predicated upon the 
Stipulation (Para.6 at R.l), that at times during settlement 
negotiations and at the time of the divorce hearing appellant 
represented to respondent that he was the father of the expected 
child (Para.7 at R.2), that based upon those representations made 
not only to respondent but to the divorce court, respondent was 
induced to enter into the Stipulation (Para.8 at R.2), that he 
was not the father of the child (Para.10 at R.2), that the inten-
tional and/or negligent misrepresentation made by appellant con-
stituted fraud in the inducement to enter a contract and a fraud 
upon the court (Para.12 at R.3), and that therefore respondent 
was entitled to have the Decree of Divorce set aside "by reason 
of the defendant's actionable fraud upon the court," that the 
Stipulation be declaredf!null, void and rescinded at law by reason 
of fraud in the inducement," for a new trial, etc., including 
$10,000 punitive damages (R.4). The Complaint in this action 
was and is completely silent about any ground for relief other 
than fraud (R.1-5). 
Additional pertinent facts were found by the trial court 
(R.132-136) and are not disputed by appellant. No.2: "This is 
an action in which the plaintiff seeks relief ... from a Decree 
of Divorce ... to-wit, that said Decree to be set aside by reason 
of actionable fraud committed upon the court by defendant and 
that a stipulation and agreement in said case be declared null 
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and void by reason of fraud in the inducement committed by de-
fendant upon plaintiff;" No. 3: ,fThe alleged fraud complained by 
plaintiff was that at times during the separation of the parties 
hereto and during settlement negotiations and prior to the execu-
tion of said Stipulation and Agreement (of settlement) and at 
the time of the interlocutory hearing [appellant] represented 
to [respondent], and to the court, that the unborn child with 
which she was pregnant was the natural biological offspring of 
[respondent] and therefore the legitimate issue of the marriage, 
and that based upon said representations of paternity [respondent] 
was induced to enter into and did in fact enter into the stipu-
lation and agreement; No. 4: The minor child Melinda Sarah is 
not the natural biological issue of respondent; No. 5: On.several 
and numerous occasions (8 to 10) prior to execution by the parties 
of the Stipulation, appellant represented to respondent that he 
was the father to the child with which she was then pregnant; 
on a number of occasions this representation was made by appellant 
to respondent because respondent expressed doubts to appellant 
as to the paternity of the child and inquired of appellant whether 
or not he was in fact the father; No. 6: Respondent had competent 
and adequate legal counsel in connection with the divorce pro-
ceeding, and relied upon the advice of counsel as is evidenced 
by the proposed Stipulation which was forwarded by said counsel 
to appellant's divorce attorney; No. 7: During the summer of 
19 74, from the time at which respondent learned of appellant's 
pregnancy (in July of 19 74) to and including the date on which 
-5-
the parties executed the Stipulation and Agreement, respondent 
had doubts in his mind concerning the paternity of the child, 
and communicated these doubts to at least one third person and 
perhaps others; No. 8: Respondent was informed by appellant within 
two days after entry of the Divorce Decree that she, appellant, 
had doubts about whether or not he, respondent, was the father 
of the child; No. 10: Appellant did not destroy or conceal any 
evidence in the divorce action; No. 11: Appellant did not act 
unreasonably or recklessly in making the representation to re-
spondent that he was the father of the child; No. 13: Appellant, 
at all pertinent times, did not act with malice, wantoness, 
recklessness, nor wilfulness; No. 14: Neither the representations 
of appellant in question nor any conduct on her part, was designed 
or intended to keep respondent out of court in the divorce action 
nor to prevent him from presenting or contesting issues therein, 
nor did it have those effects; No. 15: Respondent did not rely, 
reasonably or otherwise, on the representations made by appellant; 
No. 16: Appellant did not commit fraud upon plaintiff or upon 
the court 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DUE TO A MUTUAL 
MISTAKE OF FACT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO PARTIAL RELIEF FROM 
THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PARTIES1 DECREE 
OF DIVORCE AND THAT ALL REFERENCES TO THE MINOR CHILD BE DELETED 
FROM SAID DECREE BECAUSE: 
POINT I. BY BRINGING AN INDEPENDENT ACTION, RATHER THAN 
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PROCEEDING BY MOTION IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE ACTION, RESPONDENT 
IS LIMITED TO PROVING "FRAUD UPON THE COURT11. 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., provides that it (the rule) "does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment ... or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court (emphasis added)." That the "upon the 
court" language is significant is established by a number of things. 
First, in contrast to this latter portion of the Rule, 60(b)(3) 
does not contain the language "upon the court," but pertains to 
fraud generally "whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or ex-
trinsic;" by fundamental rule of statutory construction and because 
the two phrases are contained in the same rule, the words "upon 
athe court" necessarily have a limiting effect. Secondly, in Shaw 
v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "where 'fraud upon the court1 is the gravamen of 
the proceeding it must be pursued by separate action." The signifi-
cance of that opinion is that in quoting the language of 60(b) the 
Court did not only emphasize the language "to set aside the judgment 
for fraud ...," but emphasized the entire phrase: "to set aside 
the judgment for fraud upon the court." 
Furthermore, the fact that independent actions are limited 
to granting relief from judgments based upon fraud upon the court 
is made more clear by analyzing the relationship of the three month 
limitation period contained in 60(b): "The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), 
not more than three months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken [emphasis added]." Since the three month limita-
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tion period does not apply to independent actions it is apparent 
that if the rule is construed to permit relieving parties from 
judgments in independent actions based upon any of the grounds set 
out in Rule 60(b), the three month limitation period would be tota 
emasculated and rendered meaningless. Such a result cannot have 
been intended by the drafters of Rule 60(b), and by familiar rules 
of statutory construction if ambiguous language in a statute or 
rule can be read to be consistent with the obvious intent of the 
drafters, that is the construction the statute should be given. 
Presumably it was to obviate the difficulty presented 
by the three month limitation period that respondent proceeded by 
independent action with the fraud theory upon which he originally 
claimed he was entitled to relief. The Divorce Decree from which 
respondent sought relief was entered on September 20th, 1974 and 
respondent did not choose to seek relief from that decree until 
June 30th of 1975, or six months after the three month limitation 
period had run. To relieve respondent from the future application 
of that decree as the result of an independent action based upon 
"mutual mistake11 as the trial court has done, apparently on the 
theory that that mutual mistake constitutes a reason why it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica 
tion or nany other reason11 justifying relief, is to permit respon-
dent to circumvent the obvious intent of the legislature. 
The difficulty with all of this, however, is that the 
trial court made a specific finding of fact that appellant did not 
commit fraud upon the court (#16 at R.35) and concluded as matters 
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of law that respondent was not entitled to relief upon the grounds 
of fraud, and that no representation made by appellant to respondent, 
nor any conduct on her part, constituted either intrinsic or ex-
trinsic fraud, on plaintiff, or upon the cou^ rt. 
It is therefore clear that respondent was not entitled 
to the relief afforded him by the judgment of the trial court. 
POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE 60(b) THREE MONTH LIMIT-
ATION PERIOD TO INDEPENDENT ACTIONS IN ANY EVENT. 
Even if this Court does not accept the construction of 
Rule 60(b) advanced above, it should still apply the three month 
limitation period contained therein to independent actions. Again, 
to do otherwise would be to render that limitation period completely 
meaningless because if the time for seeking relief by motion had 
expired a disgruntled party need only incur the additional expense 
of a filing and service fee. If that result had been intended the 
legislature need not have said anything at all about a limitation 
period. 
POINT III. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
LIEF BY REASON OF A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT WAS NOT RAISED BY THE 
PARTIES NOR TRIED BY THE PARTIES WITH THE EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED 
CONSENT OF APPELLANT, AND APPELLANT RECEIVED NO NOTICE THAT PLAIN-
TIFF WOULD SEEK RELIEF BASED ON SUCH GOUNDS UNTIL RESPONDENT FILED 
HIS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND RAISED SAID ISSUE FOR 
FOR FIRST TIME THEREIN. 
As is noted iji the Statement of Facts herein, supra 
p.4, the Complaint in this action was and is completely silent about 
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any ground for relief other than fraud. The record and file refle< 
what actually happened. After a two day trial on November 5th and 
6th of 1975 the trial court requested that the parties submit Memo 
andums of Points and Authorities and set the case for oral argumem 
on November 21st. At the conclusion of the oral argument the coun 
ruled that appellant was not guilty of having committed either 
intrinsic or extrinsic fraud and its minute entry (R.83) reflects 
that it granted Judgment in favor of appellant and against respon-
dent. Period. Prior to the submission of any proposed Findings 
and Conclusions, and Judgment, to the court, respondent filed a 
motion to amend the Judgment. While the Motion is not contained 
in the records before this Court, a notice of hearing thereon is 
found at R.131, and the court's minute entry at R.130 reflects thai 
the court did amend its judgment to relieve respondent from paying 
support for the child whose paternity had been at issue. Findings 
of Fact No. 2, 3, 17 and 18 are significant. Finding No. 2 says 
that this is an action in which the plaintiff seeks relief, to-wit 
that said Decree be set aside by reason of actionable fraud commitl 
upon the court by appellant. Finding No. 3 details the alleged 
fraud: that at times during the separation of the parties hereto 
and during settlement negotations and prior to execution of said 
Stipulation and Agreement (of settlement) and at the time of the 
interlocutory hearing, appellant represented to respondent, and 
to the court, that the unborn child with which she was pregnant 
was the natural, biological off-spring of respondent, and therefor( 
the legitimate issue of the marriage. Finding No. 17 is that the 
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parties entered into the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement based 
upon a mutual mistake of fact and mistaken assumption as to the 
paternity of said child Melinda Sarah Egan. Finding No. 18 details 
the alleged mutual mistake: that at times during the separation 
of the parties hereto and during settlement negotiations and prior 
to the execution of said Stipulation and Agreement (of settlement) 
and at the time of the interlocutory hearing, appellant represented 
to respondent, and to the court, that the unborn child with which 
she was pregnant was the natural, biological off-spring of respondent 
and, therefore the legitimate issue of the marriage. 
What happened is clear. Respondent alleged and attempted 
to prove only fraud. The record and file is absolutely silent on 
any other ground for relief through the trial and in fact was the 
ground of mistake first raised by respondent in his Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities which was filed on November 24th, or eighteen 
days after the conclusion of the trial. As the detailed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law made clear, the trial court emphati-
cally ruled that appellant was not guilty of any fraud. It never-
theless obviously felt inclined to afford respondent some relief. 
The trial court was obviously inclined to afford respondent some 
relief, however, and therefore it merely catagorized the allega-
tions which respondent had attempted to prove were fraudulent as 
being a "mistake." The difficulty with that is that appellant had 
no opportunity to meet the allegation that respondent had made a 
mistake. 
It is true that Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., provides that 
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every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleading. It is fundamental, however, 
that before a party is entitled to relief based on an issue, the 
issue must be trid by expressed or implied consent; Rule 15(b) U.R, 
In this case appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine respond* 
as to the nature and quality of his belatedly alleged mistake. 
The fact is that the issue of "mistake" was simply not tried, and 
respondent is therefore not entitled to relief on that ground whett 
the purported mistake be called a "mistake," "a reason why it is 
no longer equitable that the Divorce Decree should have prospective 
application," or "any other reason justifying relief from the oper-
ation of the Judgment." 
rOINT IV. FAILURE TO LITIGATE AN ISSUE IS NOT A "MISTAKE" 
JUSTIFYING RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT IN ANY EVENT. 
The Findings of Fact in this action, as well as the docu-
mentary evidence, affirmatively show that respondent had adequate 
notice of the divorce proceedings and in fact retained an attorney 
to represent him who participated fully in negotiations concerning 
the divorce and who forwarded to Mrs. Egan's attorney a Stipulatior 
and Agreement in which Mr. Egan agreed to pay $125.00 per month 
as child support for the unborn child. Mr. Egan had adequate op-
portunity to litigate the issue of paternity of the child in the 
divorce proceeding and the Findings of Fact reflect that nothing 
that appellant did ox said had the effect of preventing him from 
doing so (No. 14 at R.135). "Unless the other party is deprived 
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of an opportunity of litigating an issue there are no ground? for 
setting aside the judgment;11 Haner v. Haner, 13 U.2d 299, 373 P.2d 
577 (1962). Courts "will not set aside a judgment because it was 
founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or any 
matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment 
assailed;11 Throckmorton v. U.S., 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93. Why, 
then, should they set aside a judgment because a disgruntled party 
failed to litigate an issue, whatever the reason? The result of 
doing so is obvious, and would be disastrous for already overburdenea 
court calendars. The reason for trials is to resolve disputes and 
provide litigants with an opportunity to air all issues. In fact, 
the policy of the law is that all claims which are related must 
be tried together. As this Court pointed out in Wheadon v. Pearson, 
14 U.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962), 
Parties should litigate their entire claim, 
demand and cause of action, and every part, 
ground and issue thereof, and if one of the 
parties fails to raise any point or issue, 
or to litigate any part of his claim ... and 
the matter goes to final judgment, such party 
may not again litigate that claim, demand or 
cause of action, or any issue, point or part 
thereof which he could have but failed to lit-
igate in the former action; 
In fact situations where it is necessary to elect remedies A cannot 
sue B on one theory, lose the case, and then go back and file a 
second action against B based on a different theory claiming that 
he was "mistaken11 in failing to allege and try the second theory 
in the first place. If divorce defendants who subsequently become 
disillusioned with their obligations are allowed to go back into 
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court in independent actions on the theory that they "mistakenly11 
entered into divorce stipulations or failed to litigate issues, 
then there will simply be no finality to divorce decrees* Such 
a result obviously ought to be avoided. 
Further, the case of Board of Education of Granite School 
v. Cox, 16 U.2d 20, 395 P. 2d 55 (1964), makes it clear that the 
"equity" involved in subdivision (6) of Rule 60(b) is something 
more than the mere fact that a party subsequently becomes dissat-
isfied because of his failure to actively litigate an issue in an 
earlier or a separate proceeding, such as is the case here involved 
In Cox, the plaintiff School District had obtained a $42,000 Defaul 
Judgment in condemnation against a husband and wife. In subsequent 
proceedings, by motion, the District Court set aside a Default Judg 
ment as to the wife, but refused relief to the husband, and did 
nothing to change the amount of the Judgment. The husband appealed 
to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decisions of the District 
Court, and upon remittitur the plaintiff sought an order compel-
ling the defendant husband to convey his individual interest for 
$21,000; at the same time the husband sought to have the plaintiff 
pay the whole $42,000 upon the ground that the Judgment for that 
amount had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court noted 
that when the district court granted the wife's motion, the properl 
to be conveyed was reduced by her interest, and that the judgment 
for $42,000 was no longer appropriate. While the Court considered 
both subdivisions (6) and (7), and did not specify which section ii 
based its decision on, it is absolutely clear from the 
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facts of the case that the $42,000 judgment was not appropriate. 
It is not at all clear in this case that the judgment for $125.00 
per month child support in not appropriate, and the Cox case 
therefore cannot constitute a basis for relieving respondent from 
the child support obligation. 
A brief perusal of the cases annotated under subdivision (7) 
of Rule 60(b) (1975 Pocket Supp) also makes it clear that something 
more is required to justify relief from the operation of a judgment 
than a mere desire to retrieve a lost opportunity to litigate an 
issue. The reason in Dickson v. Dickson, 121 Utah 259, 250 P.2d 1211, 
was that a formal order had been signed and entered upon the erroneous 
assumption that it conformed to a direction of the court theretofore 
made; Dickson still required that the motion be made within a rea-
sonable time. Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras, 11 U.2d 357, 
359 P.2d 21, establishes that a lack of due process in the proceed-
ings attacked is f!any other reason justifying relief.fl Obviously, 
again, there is no lack of due process of law in the proceedings 
attacked by respondent. 
Because there is little Utah law on the subject, federal 
decisions are instructive, and the writer commends to the Court the 
annotations at 14 A.L.R. Fed.309: F.R.C.P.: Relief From- Final Judg-
ment (dealing with the provision that "it is no longer equitable that 
a judgment should have prospective application11) and at 15 A.L.R. Fed. 
193 Relief From Final Judgment - Mistake (dealing with the "any 
other reason justifying relief" provision), and strongly urges that 
the Court consider those annotations before making its decision 
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herein. 
The main principles to be adduced from the annotations 
cited are that: 
1. The type of final judgment to which subdivision (6) 
of Utahfs Rule 60(b) is most often applied is, by its intended fori 
and nature, an injunctive decree, the courts providing relief when 
the prospective application of such a decree is no longer equitablt 
2. That equitable standards to be applied in determinii 
a motion for relief made under subdivision (6) are strict noth-
ing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evolved by new and 
unforeseen conditions will suffice to change a final judgment 
and such standards frequently require denial of motion for relief 
made thereunder; and, 
3. That the purpose of the provisions under discussion 
was to make the principles developed in equity practice for relief 
from the prospective application of a final judgment available for 
relief in motion practice under the rules. 
The leading federal case on the question is U.S. v. Swif 
286 U.S. 106, 76 L.Ed. 999, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932), which involved an 
injunction against the defendants maintaining a monopoly (meat pac 
ing). Justice Cardozo said, at 286 U.S. 119: 
There is need to keep in mind steadily limits of 
inquiry proper to the case before us. We are not 
framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether 
anything has happened that will justify us now in 
changing a decree. The injunction, whether right 
or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its ap-
plication to the conditions that existed at its 
making. We are not at liberty to reverse under 
the guise of adjusting. ... Nothing less than a 
clear showing of grievous wrong evolved by new 
-16-
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change 
what was decreed after years of litigation and with 
the consent of all concerned. 
Humbile Oil $ Refining Company v. American Oil, 405 F.2d 
803 (8th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 905, established guide-
lines to be applied in a determination of th}.s question, the court 
stating that they derived from the U.S. v. Swift decision: 
(1) That where modification and amendment of 
an existing decree are under consideration, there 
arenlimits of inquiry11 for the decree court and 
for the reviewing court; (2) That the inquiry 
is "whether the changes are so important that 
dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated 
to a shadow." (3) That the movants must be 
"suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected" 
as to be regarded as victims of oppression; and 
(4) that there must be nothing less than "a 
clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new 
and unforeseen conditions." 
In other words, modification is only cautiously to be 
granted and merely some change is not enough; the hardship and 
oppression must be significant, extreme and unexpected, and "the 
movant's task is to provide close to an unanswerable case." 
The writer respectfully submits that none of those 
conditions are present in the case under consideration by the Court. 
There has been no change of circumstances frojn the time the decree 
complained of was entered (in fact the instant proceeding has only 
served to illustrate that the facts now are exactly as they were 
then), and even if the trial court's finding of non-paternity could 
be construed as a change in circumstance, it was obviously not an 
unforeseeable condition and should have been litigated in the divorce 
trial. The annotations to which the Court is referred make it plain 
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that the provisions of Rule 60(b) in question are simply not in-
tended to be a substitute for appeal, which is exactly what re-
spondent is asking the Court to make them. Such a construction 
would emasculate our Rules of Civil Procedure providing for stict 
time limits for post judgment relief. 
Further, the annotations urged upon the Court make it 
clear that in determining what is a reasonable time, the effect 
of granting relief on the party opposing the motion and whether ox 
not rights of any other person have intervened are substantial fac 
to be considered. The rights of the child have obviously interver 
and the effect on the appellant of the grant of the relief is just 
as harsh upon her as is the harshness which respondent belatedly 
urged upon the court. 
SUMMARY 
The case before the Court is a difficult one for all 
involved except the Court. It is difficult for the parties becau 
of the nature of the facts involved; the outcome turns, however, 
on legal matters rather than factual issues. The question, which 
must be resolved in light of the fundamental legal principle that 
judgments should be afforded every possible decree of finality an 
conclusiveness, is not whether respondent would at some point in 
time have been entitled to a different judicial determination as 
to his obligations and responsibilities under the parties decree 
of divorce (because of the factual matter which he may have esta) 
lished in this proceeding); rather, the question is at what poin 
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in time respondent was required to litigate the issue of paternity; 
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 U.2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972). That point 
in time was in the divorce proceeding in which appellant had filed 
a complaint alleging that Mr. Egan was the father of the child with 
which she was then pregnant. To hold otherwise would be tanamount 
to saying that when a person makes an allegation in a complaint 
he must also serve the opposing party with some sort of pleading 
I 
informing the opponent that the opponent is not entitled to rely 
on the allegations in the complaint. That is clearly contrary to 
the spirt of the rules of our procedure which require parties to 
admit facts which they do not contest and to deny facts that they 
do contest so that issues for trial are promptly and clearly framed, 
This case was pled as a fraud case, tried essentially 
as a paternity case, but it is really only a statute of limitations 
case. Respondent simply sought his relief to late. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MEREDITH, BARBER Q DAY 
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